A Note on "Types" of Political Personality:

Nuclear, Co-Relational, Developmental

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Even a cursory inspection of the literature of the behavioral and social sciences indicates that the term "type" has a less luminous halo than it had when Carl Jung, for instance, was writing about "Psychological Types". We shall, however, presume on the syntactic and semantic sophistication of the age and use the term as a convenient label for a pattern that is at once contextual and empirical. The pattern is contextual because it is defined as referring to significant features of the social process; it is empirical because it is expected to sum up findings and to point the way to further research.

A Three-fold Classification of Types

A *"nuclear"* type connects a political role with intense predispositions of the total personality (See Lasswell, 1930, especially chapter 4). The man who succeeds to an office in which he has no interest is at one end of the scale; the one whose whole life is focused on reaching the Presidency is at the other. We might provisionally introduce the term "politician" to characterize the individual whose life is focused on gaining office. (Later in the paper I shall develop a fuller delineation of an equivalent conception designed to deal with power-centered individuals—the "political personality".) Paralleling the notion of the "politician" as one whose life revolves around the pursuit of one particular value—that of power—we can

functionally define other roles in terms of the pursuit of other values. Thus we might describe individuals whose lives are focused on the pursuit of enlightenment as "scientists", excluding from this classification those who happen merely conventionally to be called scientists, but who are primarily concerned with other values such as respect, well-being, power, etc.

A cross-sectional survey of those who play a particular role during a given period may show that "politicians" can be distinguished from "scientists", for example, in several ways. Thus "politicians" and "scientists" may come from different social strata and educational backgrounds, they may differ psychologically in a variety of ways—say, ability to tolerate ambiguity, cognitive style and willingness to engage in interpersonal relations. Such findings describe "*co-relational*" types; the data are not necessarily linked to an explanatory theory of how political personalities are formed. This is the province of "*developmental*" typologies. Thus we may find that the developmental experiences of "politicians" and "scientists" differ in distinctive ways. As political scientists our special responsibility is developmental, since political socialization, which is the transmitting and acquiring of political culture includes the formation of political types.

In order further to exhibit the defining characteristics of nuclear, co-relational and developmental types and to show how they relate to each other, it is useful to quote an earlier discussion (Lasswell, 1930, 49–61).

> Political types may be set up on a three-fold basis: by specifying a nuclear relations, a co-relation, and a developmental relation.
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> What is meant by the choice of a nuclear relation may be illustrated by the concept of *Machtmensch* as elaborated by Eduard Spranger in his *Lebensformen* . . . The gist of Spranger's generalization of the political man [politician or political type in the usage of this paper] is schematically expressible in terms of desire-method-success. The political man desires to control the motives of others; his method may vary from violence to wheedling; his success in securing recognition in some community must be tangible. These are the nuclear relations which are essential to the type definition . . .
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> [Such a type is] distinguished according to some nuclear relation among a few variables. The characteristic mode of elaborating such a type is to imagine a host of situations in which the type may be found and to describe the resulting picture. For these impressionistic methods it is possible to substitute a more formal procedure. Having chosen a central primary relation, it is possible to find, by reference to specific instances, the relative frequency with which other traits are associated with the nuclear ones . . . The result . . . is to define "*co-relational*" (correlational) types . . .
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> Almost every nuclear and co-relational type carries developmental implications. The terms which are used to characterize motives have dynamic, genetic, formative coronas of meaning which, vaguely though they may be sketched, are emphatically present. When Michels says that a "Catonian strength of

conviction" is one mark of the political leader, it is implied that if one pushed his inquiry into the adolescence, childhood and even infancy of the individual that this ruling characteristic would be visible. Of course, Michels does not himself develop these implications; it is doubtful if he has tried to find the early analogues of the trait which he called "Catonian strength of conviction" on the adult level. But the dynamic penumbra of the term can lead empirical investigators to scrutinize the behavior of children from a new point of view . . . Developmental types . . . describe a set of terminals, adult reaction and relate them to those critical experiences in the antecedent life of the individual which dispose him to set up such a mode of dealing with the world.

Models of the Political Order and of Political Personality

In order to guide the study of political types the scientific observer finds it essential to provide himself with a generalized scheme, a model, for use in searching out the "political" features in any social process, whether contemporary or historical, territorial or pluralistic. He also needs to use an exploratory scheme of "personality". I shall not elaborate the social process model in detail, since this has been done in other places.[1] The present focus is on "personality", particularly on the developmental study of political personality. It is, however, pertinent to recapitulate the principal contours of the social and political process.

A social process is characterized by mutual influencing: the *participants* are seeking to maximize[2] (optimalize) *values* (preferred outcomes) by using *institutions* affecting *resources*. The following eight terms are used to refer to values: power (P), the giving or receiving of support in the important decisions made in a social context; enlightenment (E), the giving or receiving of information; wealth (W), the giving or receiving of control over resources; well-being (B) similarly for access to safety, health and comfort; skill (S), similarly for opportunity to acquire and exercise talent; affection (A), similarly for love, friendship, loyalty; respect (R) similarly for recognition; rectitude (D), similarly for religion and ethics.

The conception of political personality that we suggest has the three major components shown in Table 1: a value focus, the patterning of behavior vis à vis the value the individual is focused on and, finally, psychological and somatic components. The table indicates that when a person is relatively centered on the power value, he fits the definition of political personality. This defines according

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[1] For the present model see Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950 and McDougal, Lasswell and Vlasic, 1963.

[2] The maximizing principal may be strictly defined as in traditional economics, or more loosely defined, as in Simon, to require "satisfaction". See Simon, 1955.

TABLE 1

POLITICAL PERSONALITY*

Political Personality	= emphasizes the pursuit of power in preference to other values
	= utilizes specialized patterns to specify values
	= employs mechanisms to adapt internal perspectives and somatic operations.

*Compare with Lasswell, 1948, Chapters 2 and 3.

to nuclear type, since it presupposes knowledge of the behavior exhibited by the person in representative situations in the social process, plus understanding of his inner orientation. The simple fact that a role is performed that is conventionally perceived as political by the participants in the context does not warrant classifying a person among the political personalities. Nor, conversely, does failure to play a conventionally recognized political role necessarily imply that the person is not power oriented. Obviously the comprehensive appraisal of any social context must sample *all* value shaping and sharing processes, as they are *conventionally* understood, if the political personalities in the *functional* sense are to be identified. The point is implied when, as is sometimes the case, it is said that during the rapid growth phase of a private capitalistic economy the most power-centered persons engage in "business".

Thus, for analytic purposes, we may find ourselves categorizing as political types certain actors from a variety of conventionally designated institutions such as business, the church and the universities, and we may find ourselves excluding from the political type classification some bureaucrats, ward healers, elected officials and others who are usually thought of as political. For scientific purposes it is essential to use analytic tools that enable us to isolate functionally comparable types, since there is no reason to believe that the conventional classifications identify sufficiently comparable individuals for it to be possible *in principle* to find that the nuclear classification serves as an indicator of common co-relational, and developmental patterns.

In order to classify individuals functionally we need to employ a major distinction made in Table 1—the distinction between "values" and "specialized patterns". Individuals often use no such general categories of thought as power; they think in more concrete terms, such as wanting to be a senator, or to help their party win the election, or to win the war. The indispensable function of systematic categories is to provide the scientific observer with the tools necessary to make comparisons. They challenge the observer to discover the degree to which conventional perspectives and opera-

tions in one context have equivalents elsewhere. Hence it becomes possible to describe the value priorities from society to society, sub-group to subgroup, or from person to person. Thus, for example, Actor A, a medieval cleric, and Actor B, a nineteenth century Amer-ican businessman, may exhibit similar "specialized patterns" focusing on the pursuit of power, even though A and B justify their behavior in quite different ways and neither employs a general category of thought referring explicitly to power. And in society A the institu-tions that are specialized to power may be commonly thought of as "churches", and in society B they may be thought of as "industries". In addition, contextual analysis may confirm the assertion that some societies give little encouragement to the pursuit of power in com-munity decisions.

Principal "Mechanisms"

The reference in Table 1 to the "mechanisms" employed by the individual in internal adaptation covers all the modes by which "impulses" to complete an "act" are dealt with. One convenient scheme (presented in Table 2) underlines the principal mechanisms by which psychological conflicts are resolved. (All initiated acts are not conflicting; some are facilitative or uninvolved.) A brief consider-ation of typical mechanisms for dealing with psychic conflict and of the personality structures to which they are related will take us to a discussion of how to analyze intrapersonal and environmental determinants of the development and persistence of political personality.

TABLE 2
MECHANISMS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

a		Rejection
b		
c		Suppression
d		
e		Repression
f		
g		Resistance
h		

The break in each line in Table 2 indicates the passage from "unconscious" and "pre-conscious" events in the sequence to wak-ing awareness (and somatic expression). Act *b* is shown as rejected, which means that a possible act completion (such as voting on a measure in which the individual has little interest) is overriden in favor of not voting. Act *d* is shown as suppressed. Suppression refers to the exclusion of an act from completion after an intense subjective

conflict, such as a conflict between loyalty to two candidates who are one's close friends. Repression (act *f*) results from an exceedingly acute conflict that ends by establishing an internal inhibition against allowing the alternatives to reach full waking awareness (such as an intense urge to kill). Once established the inhibition operates as a resistance prior to awareness. However, the extensive clinical literature on "the return of the repressed" suggests that resisted (act *h*) impulses may obtain partial completion in the form of somatic symptom behavior (such as "accidentally" hitting someone) or in the form of symbol behavior. Among the many mechanisms that operate on symbolic events (subjectivities) rather than somatic expressions are "condensation", "detachment", (and so on). These may manifest themselves not only in dreams, jokes and slips of the tongue, but also, for example, in a political actor's choice of metaphors and other figures of speech.

At the several phases of inter-act adaptation various personality structures take form. The psychoanalytic distinctions, for instance, are pertinent here: the "super-ego" refers to the inhibiting and facilitating patterns that function prior to full waking awareness; the "ego" covers the "aware" patterns; the "id" refers to the impulses which are denied full subjectivity and expression, save at the cost of vivid anxiety. If, for example, the super-ego is excessively strict, repression may take its toll by generating apathy or otherwise inhibiting the channeling of impulse energies into action.

Political personalities can be profitably examined to discover the extent to which the completion of power-oriented acts is able to mobilize the *potential intensities* available to the personality system as a whole. Similarly, it is feasible to discover which specific institutional outcomes are the objects of power perspectives and operations as well as the inner mechanisms by which various act potentials are adapted within the total system.

Fundamental to dynamic analysis (developmental study) is the conception of political personality at any given cross-section of the career line as established by a process of relative value indulgence. Table 3 suggests how stability and instability of political personality dynamics may be analyzed in terms of the consistency of the political actor's expectations of and experiences with relevant positive and negative sanctions. Table 4 suggests how the actor's environment contributes to the stability of political personality.

For an example of what is implied by Tables 3 and 4, we may consider various of the slow-changing village societies of the globe. In such societies most preadults are successfully socialized to play adult roles by passing through sequences of interaction with the environment in which the preadult eventually integrates a stable system of perspective and operation (Table 3), and the social environ-

TABLE 3
POLITICAL PERSONALITY DYNAMICS

Political ─────────────────→ perspectives and operations remain *stable* ──────────────→	when expected to yield net value advantages when net value advantages are realized
Political ─────────────────→ perspectives and operations are *unstable* ──────────────→	when expectations are confused or contradictory when realized net value advantages are confused or contradictory.

ment provides the requisite flow of net value advantages, thanks to its appropriate expectations and realizations (Table 4).

A formulation of this kind, simple and obvious as it may seem, has yet to be corroborated in detail by suitable research. An instant's reflection reminds us of the vast complexity of the process in any society, and the difficulty that lies in the way of attempting to mobilize research talent, without creating a new "Navajo plus an anthropologist" pattern of culture; or of discovering how to make proper allowance for the impact of the new social context itself.

In Illustration . . .

As an illustration of the analytic strategy proposed here of contextual analysis of value indulgences and deprivations in order to explain personality development, consider, for a moment, the significance of an infant to those immediately involved with it. These comments are a free transcript of actual observations:

Think first of the infant as a source of *value indulgence* for the

TABLE 4
POLITICAL PERSONALITY AND ENVIRONMENT*

A stable political personality depends on	*expectations* in the environment of net advantage from providing the indulgences required to sustain stability.
	the *realization* permitted by the environment of the net indulgences required.

mother. If the mother has been doubtful of her adequacy as a wo-
man, conception and birth may be experiences of enormous
importance to her image of herself. Using abbreviations to employ the
value categories introduced above, she may enjoy a continuing quiet
euphoria, which is a positive state of well-being (B) that overwhelms
any physical inconvenience or pain. She loves herself and also the
image and the body of the child (A). She respects (R) herself; and
she may have surges of religious feeling (D) for the mystery of life.
Perhaps she perceives that a son is likely to safeguard her position
in family decisions (P), and in obtaining the income from an estate
(W). Motherhood may open up access to new sources of knowledge
(E) and skill (S).

It is also relevant to explore the significance of an infant as a
source of *deprivation* to the *mother.* If the child is sickly or deformed
the humiliation (-R) and guilt (-D) may actually disturb the mental
and physical health of the mother (-B). It may cost the love of the
husband (-A), and put an end to the prospect of exercising power
(-P), obtaining wealth (-W), or acquiring access to privileged sources
of knowledge (-E), and skill (-S).

What value *indulgences* does an *infant* obtain from the mother?
In the favorable case, nurture (B) and love (A); and a variety of
opportunities that gradually encourage curiosity (E) and the dis-
covery of latent aptitudes (S). Toys are early forms of wealth (W), as
are the excretions. An environment willing to encourage initative
is providing a basic form of respect (R); approval for conformity
("good") introduces rudimentary components of appraisal in recti-
tude (D) terms. The strong willed child may exert a major impact on
family decision (P) long before any conscious programs take shape.

An inventory of value *deprivations* is also essential to any com-
prehensive empirical investigation of a child. (I am omitting ex-
amples). Moreover, the *timing* of value indulgences and deprivations
must be clearly specified if their significance is to be brought out.
And this makes it necessary to describe the *particular patterns*
involved. To trace an interaction the observer must describe the
initiator of an act and characterize the response of the environment
in value terms. The scientific observer may say that X promises
to support Y, noting that the promise of support is given according
to the usual practice in the political culture of the relevant context.
He goes on to recount that in response to this value indulgence, Y
replies by granting X a value indulgence, perhaps in the form of a
promise of support for his later candidacy. A more comprehensive
examination may disclose many other value implications. X may
be warmly greeted and applauded by party members who feared that
he might be unwilling to go along with Y's nomination. These af-
fection and respect responses might be supplemented by economic

advantages (a contract for his construction company), disclosure of secret plans for development (enlightenment), opportunities to join a golf club (skill, etc.) and general commendation of his character (rectitude).

Confidential interviewing may indicate that, while the previous picture is correct as far as it goes, from *X's* point of view it omits many dimensions of the context. It leaves out the attacks made on him privately by disappointed supporters and friends and many other negative experiences.

The foregoing analysis calls attention to the complex interplay between values and practices, and indicates why the means at our disposal for investigation have a limited capability to disclose these relationships. Plainly, the evaluation of specific practices is subject to *external* and *internal* factors. The external changes are the indulgences and deprivations actually supplied by the environment. Obviously these depend on many factors beyond the deliberate control of the actors in the situation. The internal factors are the ego-indulging or depriving evaluations by the ego and super-ego; these "self by self" appraisals may continue for years with no external support (in fact, with deprivations by an environment in conflict with the standards applied by the conscience and the ego). Consider, for example, political prisoners who fail to change their convictions in spite of facing extreme deprivations in the environment of the concentration camp.

The theory of dynamic personality change implied in the foregoing can be summed up in these terms: *specific practices* (perceived as expressing a principal value) *result in external and internal value indulgences and deprivations that coincide with, or deviate from, net expectations prior to the outcome phase of action; expectations are modified according to results, save when the intensity with which expectations are sustained inhibits recognition of what has occurred; the rank ordering of major value categories is ratified or altered as the practices attributed to major categories rise or fall in value realization.*

The mechanisms conform to the same principles. For example, if a mechanism of rejection is applied to a specific practice and results in less than anticipated net advantage, the rejection will itself be altered on behalf of acceptance and expression.

When mechanisms, specific practices and values are not objects of relatively deliberate strategies, evaluations may occur at "unconscious" or "pre-conscious" levels, with the result that *image* components are little involved; instead, *moods* dominate the process.[3]

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[3]Dr. A. J. Brodbeck, with whom I am collaborating in a study of socialization, is especially concerned with the interplay of mood and image.

The overwhelming probability is that the mood components are usually effective without becoming fully developed objects of imaged references.

Questions Generated by the Frame of Reference

Imagine that we were omniscient, thanks to the observational methods at our disposal, and to the elegance of our theoretical system. What kinds of questions could we answer about personality and politics?

. . . It would be possible to describe the intensity with which various political perspectives and operational patterns are supported or opposed within the personality system of representative (or atypical) groups throughout the body politic. These groups would be selected by culture (e.g., ethnic origin, urban-rural, regional); by class (upper, middle or lower position in terms of power, enlightenment, wealth, well-being, skill, affection, respect, rectitude); by interest (affiliation with groups that cut across culture and class lines, or fall short of including all members of these categories); by personality (e.g., by value priorities and institutional practices; and by mechanism).

. . . Developmental patterns could be correctly predicted (retrospectively) for all nuclear and co-relational profiles. This means that we would have knowledge of the factors that condition the transfer of perspectives toward targets in the primary circle to secondary targets (from father to public political figures; from ideologies used in the family to ideologies employed in the public arenas). Among the conditioning factors would be deprivations in the primary circle that arouse pessimistic expectations regarding public persons, or, on the contrary, arouse compensatory evaluations of the beneficence of public life. At present very little can be said about this (Greenstein, 1965).

. . . Examining available information (and estimates of the future), developmental constructs could be made of the actual course of the most probable future events.

. . . On the basis of clarified goals for the body politic, policy objectives and strategies could be devised to develop the personality orientations most likely to realize and contribute to desired future results.

. . . Among the policy recommendations would be the formation of appraisal and intelligence functions capable of feeding into the decision process a stream of information about the degree to which overriding objectives are being reached (trends), the factor-combinations that explain favorable or unfavorable trends and projections of future developments.

The expansion of science and technology is such that the world has been taking giant strides toward developing comprehensive, selective and continuing self-observational institutions of the kind required. The tens of thousands of research specialists in the behavioral, social and biological sciences are, with minimum central administration or planning, studying the careers of each age group in politics and in all other sectors of social process. The computer revolution is introducing a data rich civilization equipped to provide more and more complete coverage.

Given the approximate character of the available methods for examining and explaining personality, it is especially relevant to consider the use of methods of appraisal that keep the developing context at the center of attention. By means of prototyping,[4] for instance, changes in practice can be explored systematically, while appraisal programs of "interlapping observation" keep developmental information up to date (McDougal, Lasswell, and Vlasic, 1963). Such are at least some of the far reaching implications of a configurative approach to the complexities of political personality.

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[4] See McDougal, Lasswell, and Vlasic, 1963, 268–273, and ch. 5.